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Welfare Effects of Expansions in Equilibrium
Models of an Electricity Market with Fuel Network
Sarah M. Ryan, Member, IEEE, Anthony Downward, Andrew Philpott, Member, IEEE, and Golbon Zakeri
Abstract—The welfare of electricity producers and consumers
depends on congestion in the transmission grid, generation costs
that consist mainly of fuel costs, and strategic behavior. We
formulate a game theoretic model of an oligopolistic electricity
market where generation costs are derived from a fuel supply
network. The game consists of a fuel dispatcher that transports
fuels at minimum cost to meet generator demands, generators
that maximize profit in Cournot competition, and an independent
system operator (ISO) that sets nodal prices to balance electricity
supply with linear demand functions. We prove the existence
of an equilibrium. If fuel supplies are unlimited, the same
equilibria hold in a simplified version of the game in which each
generator optimizes its fuel acquisition from the network. In
some very simple examples under different assumptions about
the rationality of generators with respect to ISO decisions,
paradoxical effects on total welfare can occur from expanding
either electricity transmission capacity or the transportation
capacity of low-cost fuel. We find some instances in which the
paradox occurs only under bounded rationality of the generators,
others where it occurs only if the generators are fully rational,
and still others where it occurs to different degrees under the
two rationality assumptions.
Index Terms—Game theory, market models, capacity expan-
sion, linear complementarity problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
INCREASING demand for electricity combined with tightersupplies of fuels for generating plants have raised aware-
ness of the interaction between electricity markets and the
infrastructure for delivering fuel to generators. In restructured
electricity markets, generating companies submit bids to sup-
ply electricity at prices based on their marginal costs, which
are driven largely by fuel costs. In each regional wholesale
power market, an independent system operator (ISO) manages
electricity transmission and sets locational marginal prices
(LMPs) to match supplies with demands at each location
on the constrained grid. While considerable attention has
been focused on expanding transmission capacity to reduce
congestion in the electricity network, less effort has been spent
on understanding how constraints in the fuel delivery networks
interact with those in the electricity transmission network to
affect the total social welfare.
An integrated model of fuel and electricity supply and
delivery can help cultivate this understanding. In this paper, we
develop a game theoretic model that accounts for (1) costs of
extracting and transporting finite supplies of fuels across routes
with limited capacity, (2) strategic decisions of generators at
S. Ryan is with the Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems
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different locations across a congested electricity transmission
network, (3) price-sensitive demands for electricity, and (4)
matching of electricity supply and demand across the network
to maximize total social welfare subject to physical trans-
mission constraints. Given the fuel and electricity network
topology and capacities, fuel supplies and costs, transmission
line reactances, and demand functions, the model produces
LMPs and quantities of electricity generated and consumed at
each location on the grid. These represent a static view of,
say, a particular hour in some scenario of cost, capacity and
demand. Social welfare measures derived from the electricity
prices and quantities in different scenarios indicate the benefit
of improving the fuel delivery or electricity transmission
infrastructure.
The size and complexity of the electricity generation and
transmission systems pose modeling challenges that are ex-
acerbated by the need to account for strategic behavior by
generators in the wholesale power markets. In recent years, a
consensus seems to have emerged that considering generators
as Cournot competitors, who at any given time decide on
quantities of electricity to inject into the market, achieves a
reasonable tradeoff between realism and tractability. In these
models, the ISO’s role is to determine transmission quan-
tities that satisfy physical constraints and prices that match
quantities supplied at each location with amounts customers
are willing to buy. Such a model does not capture temporal
dependencies such as ramping constraints, the actual structure
of supply function bids, nor the potential for generators to
learn from previous market outcomes. However for plan-
ning purposes, its results can provide a plausible snapshot
of generation and transmission quantities along with nodal
electricity prices that may be expected from a given set of
generation capacities, transmission capacities and fuel costs.
Recent comparisons of existing models for competition in
electricity markets show that model assumptions concerning
the timing of decisions and the rationality of the competing
generators have significant impacts on the results [1]. In a
game theoretic model that attributes full rationality to the
generators, there may be multiple equilibria or none at all.
In either case, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about
the social welfare effects of changing model parameters such
as costs or capacities. Various bounded rationality assumptions
may result in easily computed equilibria that are more or less
competitive than those observed in actual markets.
Accounting for the sources of fuel costs requires additional
simplifications to maintain tractability. In the U.S. in 2007,
49% of net generation was from coal, which is transported
from several coal-producing regions over a complex net-
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work of railways, rivers and roads; 22% from natural gas,
which moves from domestic wells and import points primarily
through pipelines; and 19% from nuclear fuel, which carries
severe safety restrictions in transport. Fuel costs accounted for
78% of the operating costs of fossil steam and 91% of the costs
of the operating costs of gas turbine and small scale plants run
by major investor-owned utilities [2]. The prices generators
pay for these fuels, which account for both extraction and
transportation, are set in bilateral contracts and commodities
markets. These prices, which represent costs to the generators,
also could be influenced by strategic competitive behavior
among suppliers, transporters, and brokers, as well as the
generators competing in these upstream fuel markets. In this
paper, we model the entire fuel supply system as though it
were managed by a benign fuel dispatcher, whose goal is
to minimize the total cost of supplying the fuel required by
the generators to produce their chosen quanitites of electricity.
A minimum cost network flow formulation includes available
supplies as well as costs and capacities of transportation links
between fuel supply locations and the generators. Quelhas et
al. [3]; [4] recently formulated and validated such a model for
the coal- and natural gas-based portion of the U.S. national
electric energy system, while treating electricity demand as
fixed.
Network models that integrate fuel supply markets with
electricity markets have been developed, assuming those mar-
kets are perfectly competitive [5], [6]. But, due to concerns of
generator market power partly caused by transmission limits,
most recent models of electricity markets have incorporated
some form of oligopolistic competition leading to a Nash
equilibrium. The challenge is to find a balance between realism
of the model assumptions and analytical tractability for large,
complex systems. In particular, existence and uniqueness of
equilibria are not always guaranteed. Linear mixed comple-
mentarity models have been developed in which generators
set quantities as Cournot competitors [7] or submit supply
functions with conjectures about competitor responses [8],
[9]. Special computational procedures have been developed
to compute equilibria in multi-leader games [10] or Cournot
competition with anticipation of congestion effects [11]. Com-
putational tests have shown how assumptions in Cournot
models about market design, timing of decisions and generator
rationality can affect the results significantly [1]. Recently,
Yao et al. [12] introduced an electricity market model with
a bounded rationality assumption that allows an equilibrium
to be computed by solving a linear complementarity problem
based on quadratic generation costs. Because the fuel trans-
portation problem also can be expressed in terms of linear
complementarity constraints, it appears promising to com-
bine the constraints from the electricity network model with
those from the fuel network model, effectively substituting
piecewise-linear fuel costs for the quadratic generation costs.
In numerical tests [13], electricity prices and transmission
quantities from the resulting combined model show reasonable
fidelity to results of a detailed agent-based simulation in which
generators submit supply-function bids with learning.
The goal of this paper is to carefully examine whether an
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for such a model, and if
so, what effects on social welfare may result from increasing
capacities of either fuel transportation links or electricity trans-
mission lines, according to the model. We find some instances
in which improvements in these infrastructures actually harm
the total social welfare. In an application of the electricity
market model of [12] to value transmission assets, Sauma and
Oren [14] observed at least one instance where transmission
expansion decreased the total social welfare predicted by
the model. We explore a set of small instances in which
similar effects are seen under either bounded rationality or
full rationality assumptions. Paradoxical effects of capacity
increases in transportation networks under competition also
are known to exist [15] (English translation in [16]); [17].
A special case of our model is equivalent to one in which
each fuel supply arc represents a different generation unit with
a constant marginal cost. Therefore, increasing capacity in a
fuel supply arc is akin to increasing the capacity of a unit. Only
a few studies have addressed interactions between generation
expansion and transmission expansion in a market context. In
[18] and [19], an iterative simulation of coordinated investment
decisions over a long time horizon was devised, in which the
ISO sends market-based price signals to independent GENCOs
and TRANSCOs. In [14], an equilibrium model similar to
ours was the basis for studying the social welfare impacts of
transmission expansions when generation expansion responses
are taken into account, but the welfare impacts of generation
expansions were not examined explicitly.
In Section II, we formulate equilibrium models for an
electricity market combined with a fuel network under varying
assumptions about generator rationality. In Section III, we
show that an equilibrium exists under the bounded rationality
assumption of [12]. In the case of unconstrained fuel supplies,
we also formulate a simplified version in Section IV in which
each generator optimizes its fuel acquisition from the network.
The equilibria from the original formulation are preserved in
this case. In Section V, we study small examples in the sim-
plified formulation with two or three electricity nodes, which
possess unique equilibria and also can be studied under full
rationality. We show cases where expanding fuel transportation
or electricity transmission capacity is detrimental to social
welfare under either or both rationality assumptions. Section
VI concludes.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
TABLE I
SETS OF NODES AND ARCS
Set Description Indices Cardinality
N Electricity nodes i, j nE
B Electricity transmission lines l mE
F Fuel supply nodes g nF
A Fuel supply lines gj mF
We model the electricity system along with its fuel supply
as a network of electricity nodes and fuel supply nodes with
transmission lines as directed arcs connecting the electricity
nodes and transportation routes as directed arcs from the
fuel nodes to the electricity nodes. Table I specifies the
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TABLE II
MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Dimension
a Intercepts of electricity demand prices as linear functions of quantities nE × 1
b Slopes of electricity demand prices as linear functions of quantities nE × 1
M = diag(b) Diagonal matrix of demand function slopes nE × nE
V Generation capacities nE × 1
D Power transfer distribution factors based on a fixed reference node r ∈ N mE × nE
K Transmission line capacities mE × 1
Z Quantities of fuel available nF × 1
c Costs per MWh-equivalent of fuel transported mF × 1
U Capacities of fuel supply lines mF × 1
a
b
c
1
2
3
Fig. 1. Illustration with three fuel nodes {a, b, c} and three electricity nodes
{1, 2, 3}. Here, V3 = 0 = a1 and b1 = −∞.
sets of nodes and arcs. Assume each electricity node in
N = {1, . . . , nE} has exactly one load-serving entity (LSE)
and one generator. We allow for nodes without generators
by setting their generation capacities to zero, while multiple
generators at the same node can be modeled by connecting
dummy nodes with infinite-capacity transmission lines. Figure
1 illustrates the model of a small system.
The data for the model include parameters of linear demand
functions for the LSEs; capacities of generators, transmission
lines, and fuel supply routes; and quantities of fuels available
together with their costs. The model parameters are described
in Table II. Assume each demand function slope b i < 0, i ∈
N . Any node i without a load has ai = 0, bi = −∞.
Flows on the transmission lines are modeled in terms of a
lossless direct current approximation of Kirchhoff’s laws using
power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs). The element D l,j
specifies the change in flow on line l that results from a
one-unit injection of electricity at node j accompanied by a
corresponding one-unit withdrawal at the fixed reference node.
It is the negative of the generation shift factor computed as in
[20] from the transmission line reactances. For simplicity, we
assume that generation costs are due solely to fuel. Multiple
fuel types may be included in the fuel supply network, where
all flows are in MWh of energy content. The cost per unit of
flow on a fuel arc includes all costs for procuring the fuel at
the origin, transporting it, and converting it to electricity at the
destination. A given generator may obtain fuels from multiple
supply nodes at different costs and each fuel node may supply
multiple generators. The fuel network in this paper ignores the
different time horizons that arise from fuel storage capabilities
and assumes costs and capacities are on an hourly basis. A
non-bipartite network incorporating storage and multiple time
scales as in [3] could be substituted.
The model centers on decisions of the generators. We
assume that each is an independent Cournot competitor that
decides its own generation quantity, given the corresponding
quantities of other generators. In the Nash-Cournot equilibrium
model, generators make these decisions simultaneously. We
combine these decisions with downstream decisions of an
independent system operator (ISO) that determines quantities
of electricity supplied and consumed at each node, given the
generation quantities, by specifying nodal injections. Similar
game theoretic models of electricity markets have been ana-
lyzed in, e.g., [1] and [7] – [11] under varying assumptions
about the extent to which each player anticipates the actions
of the others. Typically in these papers, the generation cost is
assumed to be a known function, such as linear or quadratic,
of the generation quantity. In this paper, we explicitly model
costs that result from a fuel supply network by including the
fuel flows upstream of the generators. We assume these flows
are decided by a non-strategic fuel dispatcher that minimizes
the total cost of delivering the fuel required by the generators
given their decisions. Primal and dual decision variables are
summarized in Tables III and IV, respectively. The dual
variable η represents the price of electricity at the reference
node while p is the vector of nodal electricity prices. Also
define the nodal price premia, φ ≡ p−ηe, where e is a vector
of ones.
Let Fj ⊆ F be the set of fuel supply nodes g such that
there exists an arc from g to j and Ng be the set of electricity
nodes j supplied by fuel node g. The fuel dispatcher’s (primal)
decision problem is a linear transportation problem:
FDP minx≥0
∑
gj∈A
cgjxgj
s.t. − ∑
j∈Ng
xgj ≥ −Zg, ∀g ∈ F [ωg ≥ 0]∑
g∈Fj
xgj = yj, ∀j ∈ N [πj ]
−xgj ≥ −Ugj , ∀gj ∈ A [ρgj ≥ 0]
Here, the first set of constraints are on the fuel supplies, the
second set ensure that the fuel delivery to each generator meets
the demand created by electricity production, and the third
enforce the fuel transportation capacities. We assume without
loss of generality that Zg > 0, ∀g ∈ F , and Ugj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈
This is a manuscript of an article from IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 25 (2010): 1337, doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2039587. Posted with permission.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 4
TABLE III
PRIMAL DECISION VARIABLES
Variable Description Player Dimension
q Demand satisfied at electricity nodes ISO nE × 1
r Net injections of electricity at electricity nodes ISO nE × 1
x Quantities of fuel delivered Fuel Dispatcher mF × 1
y Generation amounts Generators nE × 1
TABLE IV
DUAL DECISION VARIABLES
Variable Corresponding primal constraint Player Dimension
ω Supplies at fuel nodes Fuel Dispatcher nF × 1
π Demands for fuel by generators Fuel Dispatcher nE × 1
ρ Fuel line capacities Fuel Dispatcher mF × 1
η Total generation equal to satisfied demand ISO Scalar
p Electricity market clearing conditions at nodes ISO nE × 1
λ+ Upper bound on transmission from lower- to higher-numbered node ISO mE × 1
λ− Upper bound on transmission from higher- to lower-numbered node ISO mE × 1
β Aggregated electricity demand for network Generators nE × 1
μ Generation capacities Generators nE × 1
A.
The dual of the fuel dispatcher’s problem is:
FDD maxω,ρ≥0,π −
∑
g∈F
Zgωg +
∑
j∈N
yjπj −
∑
gj∈A
Ugjρgj
s.t. −ωg + πj − ρgj ≤ cgj , ∀gj ∈ A
Note that the generators’ decisions, y, are treated as constants
in the dual objective function.
Also given the decisions of the generators, the ISO’s de-
cision problem is to maximize social welfare, which is the
total consumer willingness-to-pay less the sum of all the
generation costs. It is equivalent to the sum of consumers’
surplus, producers’ surplus, and transmission rents, where the
transmission rent from a flow on a line is the amount of flow
multiplied by the difference in the nodal prices at either end.
The consumer willingness-to-pay can be evaluated as the total
area under the demand functions up to the quantities supplied.
On the other hand, the total generation cost is constant with
respect to the ISO’s decisions and, therefore, can be omitted
from the primal formulation as a quadratic program:
ISOP maxq,r 12qTMq + aT q
s.t. eT r = 0 [η]
q − r = y [p]
Dr ≤ K [λ+ ≥ 0]
−Dr ≤ K [λ− ≥ 0]
The four sets of constraints represent, respectively, require-
ments that there is no net injection by the ISO, conservation
of energy at each node, and thermal capacity constraints on
the transmission flows in either direction. The Dorn dual for
this quadratic program (see page 233 of [21]) is given by:
ISOD minη,p,q,λ+,λ− yT p + KT (λ+ + λ−)− 12qTMq
s.t. −Mq + p = a
ηe− p + DTλ+ −DTλ− = 0
λ+, λ− ≥ 0
The above two problems follow the usual duality relationship
in the sense that if one is unbounded the other is infeasible and
if they are both feasible then they both have optimal solutions
having the same objective value. Note that the ISO’s problem
will always have an optimal solution; moreover, observe that
the ISO’s dual problem is a convex (quadratic) optimization
problem that is linear (therefore concave) in p and concave in
q, and the objective function is continuous in the decisions,
y, of the generators. Any solution to the ISO problem must
satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, where φ =
DT (λ+ − λ−):
a + Mq − p = 0 (1)
−ηe + p− φ = 0 (2)
eT r = 0 (3)
q − r = y (4)
0 ≤ λ+⊥K −Dr ≥ 0 (5)
0 ≤ λ−⊥K + Dr ≥ 0 (6)
Next we examine generator i’s problem of maximizing
profit, which is the difference of revenue and generation cost,
subject to its capacity constraint. Revenue depends on the ISO
decisions while cost is determined by the fuel dispatch. We
will set the fuel charges such that each generator pays for
just the fuel that they use (there is no congestion charge); this
means that generator i would be charged∑
g|gi∈A
cgixgi,
determined from the optimal solution to FDP. In section IV
we prove that in the case of unlimited fuel supply (Z = ∞),
generators seeing only the marginal costs of fuel associated
with their current generation levels arrive at the same equilib-
rium as those who can anticipate their effect on the total fuel
costs.
Generator i sells its production at the price pi determined by
the ISO. We consider two versions of the generator decision
problem that differ according to their level of rationality
concerning the ISO decisions. In the “fully rational” case,
each generator anticipates the ISO injections, transmission
flows and nodal prices that will result from its own generation
decision, given the other generation amounts. In effect, the
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generators are Stackelberg leaders with the ISO as follower.
This case is modeled by including the full set of ISO KKT
conditions as constraints in each generator’s decision problem.
Given yj, j 
= i, generator i solves a mathematical program
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC):
GiP-F maxyi≥0 (pi − πi)yi
s.t. yi ≤ Vi [μi ≥ 0]
Equations (1)− (6)
The game consisting of all generators simultaneously solving
the above problem is often modeled as an equilibrium problem
with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). These problems are non-
convex due to congestion in the transmission network. Solving
the joint-KKT conditions for all players simultaneously there-
fore yields local Nash equilibria. At these points some players
may be locally, rather than globally optimal. This type of
model is considered by Hu and Ralph in [22]. Furthermore, as
discussed in [12], a game in which generators simultaneously
solve these MPECs may have multiple equilibria or none at
all. Also, a pure-strategy equilibrium that exists may satisfy
some transmission constraint complementarity conditions as
equalities so that a line is barely congested with equal prices
at both ends.
Therefore, for tractability, we adopt the bounded rationality
assumption of [12], in which each generator observes the
price premia at each node relative to the reference node,
and does not anticipate the effect of its decisions on the
transmission quantities. Specifically, the ISO’s dual decision
variables, φ, are constants in each generator’s decision problem
(as are the fuel dispatcher’s dual decision variables, π). In this
formulation, generator i’s decision problem is:
GiP-B maxyi≥0,η (η + φi − πi)yi
s.t. yi − η
∑nE
j=1
1
bj
=∑nE
j=1
φj−aj
bj
−∑j =i yj [βi]
yi ≤ Vi [μi ≥ 0]
The first constraint expresses generator i’s knowledge of the
market-clearing condition that total supply equals total demand
in the network. Note that ISO constraints (3) and (4) imply∑
i qi =
∑
i yi. Furthermore, for i ∈ N , conditions (1) and
(2) imply qi = η+φi−aibi . Although the reference node price, η,
actually is an ISO decision, it is treated as a decision variable
in the optimization problem for each generator i because
otherwise, the nodal prices and decisions of generators j 
= i
would uniquely determine yi. In other words, given all of
the other generation quantities and the nodal price premia,
each generator anticipates the effect of its own generation
quantity on the reference node price that clears the market.
Finally, observe in the first constraint that, as the slopes bj
are negative, η is a decreasing linear function of y i. Therefore
each generator’s problem has an objective that is concave in
the player’s strategy yi.
III. EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA
Here we discuss the existence of an equilibrium to the
game consisting of a fuel dispatcher choosing fuel prices,
electricity generators injecting quantities of electricity and
an ISO determining price premia between nodes. Note that
these decision variables are derived from the generator primal
problems and the fuel dispatcher and ISO dual problems.
Rosen’s Theorem in [23] asserts that there always exists an
equilibrium to a concave n-person game; this is defined as a
game where the players’ decisions are in a compact and convex
set and their payoffs are concave in their own decision and
continuous in the decisions of the other players. In our model,
the feasible region for each of the players is defined by a set of
linear constraints; moreover, each player’s objective function
is concave in its own decision variables and continuous in
the decision variables of the other players. Unfortunately,
however, in the current formulation of the game, many of the
ISO and fuel dispatcher decisions are not in a bounded set.
To correct this, we will introduce artificial bounds on those
decision variables. The introduction of these bounds enables us
to apply the proof in [23] which guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. However, it is not obvious that in imposing these
bounds we do not introduce spurious equilibria. Therefore, we
must verify that the equilibrium, which we now know exists,
is in fact a bona fide equilibrium; i.e., it has not been created
through the imposition of these bounds. To do this we show
that an equilibrium to this game will not exist at any of the
imposed bounds, and that any equilibrium would still exist if
the bounds were removed.
Theorem 1: A Nash equilibrium exists for the game con-
sisting of FDD, ISOD and {GiP-B, i ∈ N}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the game addressed by Theorem 1, all players are
assumed to act at once. An equilibrium may be identified by
simultaneously solving the KKT conditions for all players.
That is, to equations (1) - (6), we append the KKT conditions
for the fuel dispatcher and all the generator optimization
problems:
0 ≤ xgj⊥cgj + ωg − πj + ρgj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈ A (7)∑
g∈Fj
xgj − yj = 0, ∀j ∈ N (8)
0 ≤ ωg⊥Zg −
∑
j∈Ng
xgj ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ F (9)
0 ≤ ρgj⊥Ugj − xgj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈ A (10)
0 ≤ yj⊥− η − φj + πj + βj + μj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N (11)
yj +
(∑
i∈N
1
bi
)
βj = 0, ∀j ∈ N (12)
0 ≤ μj⊥Vj − yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N (13)
The whole set of conditions comprises a linear mixed comple-
mentarity problem (MCP; see [24]). Note that the aggregate
demand constraint in each generator’s set of constraints is
redundant given the ISO constraints. Along with the inequality
conditions and corresponding nonnegative variables, there
are 5nE + 1 equations that can be matched with the same
number of unrestricted variables (π, p, r, β, q, η). This system
can be solved efficiently, for instance by the PATH solver
in GAMS [25], [26]. Existence of an equilibrium has been
established in other game models of electricity markets solved
as complementarity problems (e.g., [7]) by showing that the
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coefficient matrix is positive definite, but this condition does
not necessarily hold for our model.
IV. UNCONSTRAINED FUEL SUPPLIES
For the case where fuel supplies, Z , are ample to meet all
generator demands, we also formulate a version of each gen-
erator’s optimization problem that incorporates the acquisition
of fuel at minimum cost. In this case, the model reduces to one
in which each generator is supplied with fuel at a piecewise-
constant increasing marginal cost, independent of the actions
of the other generators.
For large Z , the corresponding dual multipliers ω = 0 at
optimality. Recall that for generator i, Fi ⊆ F is the set of
fuel supply nodes g such that there exists an arc from g to
i and let mi = |Fi|. The fuel dispatcher’s cost minimization
problem can be decomposed into a set of such problems, one
for each generator. The primal problem for generator i is:
FDPi min{xgi:g∈Fi}
∑
g∈Fi cgixgi
s.t.
∑
g∈Fi xgi = yi [πi]
−xgi ≥ −Ugi, ∀g ∈ Fi [ρgi ≥ 0]
xgi ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ Fi
The corresponding dual problem is:
FDDi maxπi,{ρgi:g∈Fi} yiπi −
∑
g∈Fi Ugiρgi
s.t. πi − ρgi ≤ cgi, ∀g ∈ Fi
ρgi ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ Fi
From duality and complementary slackness, at optimality the
values of the primal and dual objective functions are equal and
both xgi ⊥ (cgi + ρgi − πi) and ρgi ⊥ (Ugi − xgi) hold for
all g ∈ Fi. Let the arcs in {gi|g ∈ Fi} be arranged in order
of increasing cost, indexed by h and, given y i, let ki be the
smallest index h such that
∑ki
h=1 Uh > yi. Then at optimality,
xh = Uh for h < ki and
yiπi =
ki∑
h=1
chxh +
mi∑
h=1
ρhUh. (14)
Equation (14) includes not only the transportation costs but
also a congestion charge. If generators were to be charged
this amount, whenever a fuel supply line would become
saturated, the fuel price for the entire demand steps up to
the price of the next cheapest available fuel line. This would
cause the generators’ cost functions to be discontinuous.
In the simultaneous game this issue is not encountered as
the generators only consider a fixed marginal cost of fuel;
they would not anticipate how their actions may affect their
marginal cost. However, if the game were structured such that
the fuel dispatch were acting as a Stackelberg follower, the
conjectural variations would be different and some generator
might have incentive to influence their marginal cost. Hence,
any equilibrium found here would not necessarily be the same
as in the simultaneous game.
This situation, where the structure of the game can affect
the equilibrium, can be avoided by using the cost mechanism
introduced in section II. In the cost structure that we use, we
treat the fuel network problem as though it were a pay-as-bid
supply function; i.e., the cost for a generator is:
ki∑
h=1
chxh = yiπi −
mi∑
h=1
ρhUh. (15)
Under this cost structure, the cost of fuel is a continuous
increasing function of the generation quantity.
For the game where the fuel dispatcher and generators act
simultaneously, we define a new generator profit maximization
problem, GiP-B′, which is identical to GiP-B except that the
cost portion of the objective is replaced by equation (15).
Note that in this new objective, the only non-constant term is
yiπi, hence the conjectural variations of the game consisting
of FDD, ISOD and {GiP-B, i ∈ N} are identical to those of
the game consisting of FDD, ISOD and {GiP-B′, i ∈ N}.
Therefore the result of Theorem 1 is also valid for this
modified game.
For the situation where the fuel dispatcher is treated as
a Stackelberg follower, the minimum cost fuel dispatch is
incorporated into the generators’ problems. We let γ ik be the
cost of the kth least expensive fuel arc directed into node i and
Υik be its capacity. Let wik be the amount of electricity that
generator i produces from fuel obtained via the k th cheapest
arc and wi = (wi1, . . . , wi,mi)T . Then the profit maximization
problem for generator i including fuel acquisition (assuming
full rationality with respect to the ISO decisions) is:
FGiP-F maxwi
∑mi
k=1(pi − γik)wik
s.t. Equations (1)− (6)
eTwi ≤ Vi [μi ≥ 0]
−wik ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . ,mi
[
ρ−ik ≥ 0
]
wik ≤ Υik, k = 1, . . . ,mi
[
ρ+ik ≥ 0
]
The corresponding problem assuming bounded rationality
is:
FGiP-B maxwi,η
∑mi
k=1(η + φi − γik)wik
s.t. eTwi − η∑nEj′
E
1
bj
=∑nE
j′
E
φj−aj
bj
−∑j =i yj [βi]
eTwi ≤ Vi [μi ≥ 0]
−wik ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . ,mi
[
ρ−ik ≥ 0
]
wik ≤ Υik, k = 1, . . . ,mi
[
ρ+ik ≥ 0
]
In the case of unconstrained fuel supplies, to analyze small
instances it is more convenient to consider the game consisting
of {FGiP-B, i ∈ N} and ISOD. The following result in com-
bination with Theorem 1 shows that an equilibrium exists for
this game as well. Moreover, it follows that if the equilibrium
for the FGiP-B game is unique, as is the case in the instances
studied in Section V, then the equilibrium for the GiP-B game
is unique also.
Theorem 2: Suppose E = {x∗, y∗, η∗, π∗, φ∗} is an equilib-
rium in the game consisting of FDD, ISOD and {GiP-B ′, i ∈
N}. Then setting w = x∗ and retaining {y∗, η∗, φ∗} from E
constitutes an equilibrium in the game consisting of ISOD and
{FGiP-B, i ∈ N}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
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In the game that consists of ISOD and {FGiP-B, i ∈ N},
where the upstream fuel decisions are included in the gen-
erator optimization problems, conditions (7) – (13) are re-
placed by the corresponding conditions derived from problems
{FGiP-B, i ∈ N}. The equivalent set of KKT conditions is
given by:
η + φi − γik − βi − μi + ρ−ik − ρ+ik = 0, i ∈ N ;
k = 1, . . . ,mi (16)
mi∑
k=1
wik + βi
⎛
⎝∑
j∈N
1
bj
⎞
⎠ = 0, i ∈ N (17)
0 ≤ ρ−ik⊥wik ≥ 0, i ∈ N ;
k = 1, . . . ,mi (18)
0 ≤ ρ+ik⊥Υik − wik ≥ 0, i ∈ N ;
k = 1, . . . ,mi (19)
0 ≤ μi⊥Vi −
mi∑
k=1
wik ≥ 0, i ∈ N (20)
In certain small instances, it may be possible to identify
an equilibrium for the games where the generators have full
rationality, but only by an ad hoc procedure.
V. PARADOXICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we assume fuel supplies are unconstrained
and compare equilibria under the two rationality assumptions
when the generators optimize their procurement of fuel. To
focus on the total welfare impacts of fuel transportation and
electricity transmission capacities, we also assume the gener-
ation capacities, Vi, are large. To examine the possible effects
of increasing fuel transportation or electricity transmission
capacities, we analyze the generator best responses under
bounded rationality in a two-node system.
Suppose N = {1, 2}, m1 = m2 = 2, and the electricity
nodes are connected by a single line. Let f = −r1 = r2. The
surplus of generator i is
PSi = (η + φi)(wi1 + wi2)− γi1wi1 − γi2wi2,
while the consumer surpluses at the two nodes are
CS1 = −b12 (w11 +w12−f)
2, CS2 = −b22 (w21+w22+f)
2.
The transmission rents are
TR = (φ2 − φ1)f
and the total welfare is
TW ≡ PS1 + PS2 + CS1 + CS2 + TR.
Suppose that both Υ12 and Υ21 are large numbers, so that
the cost for generator 1 is γ11w11 + γ12w12 and that for
generator 2 is γ21w21. For simplicity, drop the constraints that
wi1 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2; and let ρi1 ≡ ρ+i1 and ρi2 ≡ ρ−i2. Let
node 1 be the reference. Then the simplified set of necessary
conditions for an equilibrium to the game consisting of ISOD,
FG1P-B and FG2P-B is:
a1 + b1(w11 + w12 − f)− η = 0 (21)
a2 + b2(w21 + t)− η − φ2 = 0 (22)
−λ+1 + λ−1 = 0 (23)
φ2 − λ+2 + λ−2 = 0 (24)
0 ≤ λ+1 ⊥K + f ≥ 0 (25)
0 ≤ λ−1 ⊥K − f ≥ 0 (26)
0 ≤ λ+2 ⊥K − f ≥ 0 (27)
0 ≤ λ−2 ⊥K + f ≥ 0 (28)
η − γ11 + b1b2
b1 + b2
(w11 + w12)− ρ11 = 0 (29)
η − γ12 + b1b2
b1 + b2
(w11 + w12) + ρ12 = 0 (30)
η + φ2 − γ21 + b1b2
b1 + b2
w21 = 0 (31)
0 ≤ ρ11⊥Υ11 − w11 ≥ 0 (32)
0 ≤ ρ12⊥w12 ≥ 0 (33)
The optimization problem of generator 2 is:
FG2P-B maxw21≥0,η (η + φ2 − γ21)w21
s.t. w21 − η b1+b2b1b2 = −a1b1 +
φ2−a2
b2
− y1
Upon substitution of the constraint, the objective function is a
quadratic function of y2 = w21 that is maximized by
y2 = −y12 −
a1b2 + a2b1 + b2φ2
2b1b2
+
b1 + b2
2b1b2
γ21.
That is, the best response of generator 2 given y1 is linear in
y1 with slope − 12 .
Similarly, the optimal generation quantity for FG1P-B sat-
isfies
y1 = −y22 −
a1b2 + a2b1 − b1φ2
2b1b2
+
b1 + b2
2b1b2
γ11,
if this quantity is less than Υ11;
y1 = −y22 −
a1b2 + a2b1 − b1φ2
2b1b2
+
b1 + b2
2b1b2
γ12,
if this quantity is greater than Υ11; and y1 = Υ11 otherwise.
That is, when plotted with y2 on the vertical axis, the best
response of generator 1 has slope -2 to the left and right of
Υ11 and a vertical segment at y1 = Υ11. From the slopes of
these best response functions, it is clear that the equilibrium
in (y1, y2), where the best responses intersect, is unique.
Example 1. Let p1 = 20 − 20q1, p2 = 20 − 2019q2, γ11 =
7,Υ11 = 3, γ12 = 10. Figure 2 illustrates the best responses
for γ21 = 0, 5 or 10, with K large.
The equilibrium prices and transmission quantity, as well as
the generation quantities, can be identified in any instance by
solving equations (21), (22), (29) – (31) for five unknowns.
If K is large, then all the dual variables for the transmission
constraints (and therefore, the price premium, φ2) equal zero.
The uncongested equilibrium has y1 < Υ11, such as point A
in Figure 2, if the solution to the system with w12 = ρ11 = 0
has w11 < Υ11. It has y1 = Υ11, as with point B in Figure
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Fig. 2. Bounded rationality best responses for varying γ21 for Example 1.
2, if the solution w11 = Υ11 and w12 = 0 has nonnegative
values for ρ11 and ρ12. Or, y1 > Υ11 in equilibrium, such as
point C in the same figure, if setting w11 = Υ11 and ρ12 = 0
yields a solution with w12 > 0. For smaller values of K , the
congested equilibrium falls into one of the three above cases
for y1 versus Υ11 with either f = K and φ2 = λ+2 or f =
−K and φ2 = −λ−2 . With K fixed, the welfare measures are
quadratic in Υ11 over ranges where y1 = Υ11 in equilibrium;
with Υ11 fixed, the welfare measures are piecewise quadratic
in K .
A. Effect of Transmission Capacity Increase
If power is flowing from node 1 to node 2 and the
transmission capacity, K , is reduced, then the generator best
response functions shift as shown in Figure 3 for Example
1. For this instance, Table V shows the unique equilibria
that occur under the two rationality assumptions for different
values of K . Under congestion, the shift in generation from
the lower cost generator 2 to the higher cost generator 1 as
K increases results in a reduction in the overall total welfare
despite consumers being better off. Total welfare decreases
from 149.12 when K = 0 to 145.5 when the transmission
line is uncongested. In the full rationality version of the
model, equilibria also are unique for large K and K = 0,
and the single-node equilibrium (for large K) coincides with
the bounded rationality equilibrium. When K = 0, the fully
rational generators act as monopolists rather than duopolists
as in the bounded rationality version, and the total welfare is
145.67, i.e., larger than the total welfare under full rationality
when K is large. Thus, in this instance, increasing transmis-
sion capacity reduces the total welfare under both rationality
assumptions. A recent study of the Belgian electricity market
[27] tentatively concluded that increasing transmission capac-
ity between that country and Germany or the UK, both of
which have higher generation costs, could decrease market
concentration in Belgium. Our example suggests that, although
consumers’ surplus in Belgium would increase, this might
be outweighed by a loss in producer welfare incurred by
replacing inexpensive local generation by more expensive
imported power. Moreover, the combined total welfare of both
Belgium and the exporting country (either Germany or the
UK) could decrease with the added capacity.
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
y2
Gen.1(uncong.)
Gen.2(uncong.)
Gen.1(cong.)
Gen.2(cong.)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
y1
Fig. 3. Bounded rationality best responses for K ≥ 1.45 (uncongested) and
K = 1.0 (congested) in Example 1.
2
4
6
8
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12
14
y2
Gen.1(ample
cheapfuel)
Gen.1(scarce
cheapfuel)
Gen.1(no
cheapfuel)
0
0 2 4 6
y1
Gen.2(low
cost)
Fig. 4. Bounded rationality best responses for varying Υ11.
Example 2. Paradoxical effects of increasing transmission
capacity also can occur when demand is symmetric. Table
VI illustrates an instance with a1 = a2 = 100, b1 = b2 =
−2, γ11 = 25, γ12 = 40,Υ11 = 25, γ21 = 30. Total welfare
decreases in the bounded rationality model from 2338.88 when
K = 0 to 2321.88 when K is large. Here, the duopoly
equilibrium for K = 0 has y1 = Υ11. As K increases, the
incentive for the lower cost generator 1 to increase production
is not enough to outweigh the jump in its marginal cost.
B. Effect of Fuel Transportation Capacity Increase
Again, suppose Υ12 and Υ21 are large numbers. In Example
1 with γ21 = 0, reducing Υ11 shifts the uncongested best
response of generator 1 as shown in Figure 4. Restricting
the availability of low-cost fuel to generator 1 reduces its
generation and increases production by generator 2. Table VII
shows that with K ≥ 1.45, under full rationality, the total
welfare equals 150 when Υ11 = 0 and drops to 145.5 if
Υ11 ≥ 2. The full rationality equilibrium is unique in both
cases and each coincides with the corresponding equilibrium
under bounded rationality. Thus, in this instance, increasing
capacity of low-cost fuel transportation reduces total welfare
under both assumptions about rationality with respect to the
ISO decisions.
Example 3. The impact on total welfare of increasing
availability of low-cost fuel also may differ depending on
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TABLE V
EQUILIBRIA FOR EXAMPLE 1 WITH γ21 = 0 UNDER DIFFERENT GENERATOR RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS. FOR INTERMEDIATE VALUES OF K , WELFARE
MEASURES ARE GIVEN AS COEFFICIENTS (a, b, c) OF aK2 + bK + c.
K Gen. Rat. y1 y2 f PS CS TR TW
0 Full 0.25 9.50 0.00 97.11 48.56 0.00 145.67
0 Bdd. 0.62 9.74 0.00 95.32 53.80 0.00 149.12
(0, 1.45) Bdd. 0.62 + 0.95K 9.74 - 0.51K K 1.17, -8.81, 95.32 0.15, 4.41, 53.80 -1.47, 2.12, 0.00 -0.15, -2.28, 149.12
[1.45,∞) Bdd., Full 2.00 9.00 1.45 85.00 60.50 0.00 145.50
TABLE VI
EQUILIBRIA FOR EXAMPLE 2 UNDER BOUNDED RATIONALITY. FOR INTERMEDIATE VALUES OF K , WELFARE MEASURES ARE GIVEN AS COEFFICIENTS
(a, b, c) OF aK2 + bK + c.
K Gen. Rat. y1 y2 f PS CS TR TW
0 Bdd. 25.00 23.33 0.00 1169.44 1169.44 0.00 2338.89
(0, 1.25) Bdd. 25.00 23.33 - 0.67K K 0.44, 18.89, 1169.44 1.11, -34.44, 1169.44 -2.67, 3.33, 0 -1.11, -12.22, 2338.89
[1.25,∞) Bdd. 25.00 22.50 1.25 1193.75 1128.13 0.00 2321.88
TABLE VII
EQUILIBRIA FOR EXAMPLE 1 WITH γ21 = 0, K ≥ 1.45 UNDER DIFFERENT GENERATOR RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS. FOR INTERMEDIATE VALUES OF
Υ11 , WELFARE MEASURES ARE GIVEN AS COEFFICIENTS (a, b, c) OF aΥ211 + bΥ11 + c.
Υ11 Gen. Rat. y1 y2 f PS CS TR TW
0 Full, Bdd. 0.00 10.00 -0.50 100.00 50.00 0.00 150.00
(0, 2) Bdd. Υ11 10.00 −0.5Υ11 -0.5 +0.975Υ11 -0.25, -7, 100 0.125, 5, 50 0.00 -0.125, -2, 150
[2,∞) Full, Bdd. 2.00 9.00 1.45 85.00 60.50 0.00 145.50
generator rationality with respect to the ISO decisions. In
the instance where a1 = 2, a2 = 5, b1 = b2 = −1, γ11 =
0.5, γ12 = 1.24, γ21 = 0.5, unique equlibria are found under
both rationality assumptions for Υ11 = 0 and Υ11 ≥ 53 .
With transmission capacity K = 1 under bounded rationality,
this increase in Υ11 results in a move from an uncongested
equilibrium with total welfare 8.946 to a duopoly equilibrium
under congestion with total welfare 10.222. But with K = 1 in
the full rationality version, the same increase in Υ11 shifts the
equilibrium from the same uncongested one as under bounded
rationality to a new point with separate monopolies at the two
nodes and total welfare reduced to 8.937. See Table VIII. This
occurs because the fully rational generators act strategically
with respect to the transmission line capacity.
Example 4. Paradoxical effects of increasing low cost
fuel are not restricted to two-node examples. We also have
found a three-node instance where under bounded rationality,
increasing the availability of low-cost fuel causes a shift from
one congested equilibrium to another with lower total welfare.
As in Figure 1, generators are located at nodes 1 and 2 while
demands exist at nodes 2 and 3. Transmission lines having
the same reactance connect each pair of nodes. The data are
a2 = 100, b2 = −1000, a3 = 100, b3 = −1, γ21 = 22, γ22 =
25, and γ11 = 20 with Υ11 large. Transmission capacity is
ample between node 1 and the other nodes but limited to 24.9
between nodes 2 and 3. Increasing Υ21 from 23 to 24 in the
bounded rationality model causes a shift from a congested
equilibrium with total welfare 2750.5 to another with total
welfare 2735.8 (see Table IX). Increasing the supply of low-
cost fuel to generator 2 causes an increase in production there
that is offset by a drop in price, so that its surplus as well as
that of generator 1 and the consumers at node 3 all decrease.
The biggest beneficiary of the drop in the fuel price is the
transmission owner, who collects higher rents due to the wider
price spreads. In this instance, an infinite number of equilibria
occur under full rationality for both values of Υ 21.
In these examples, the concave quadratic form for total
welfare provides insight into the effect of capacity uncertainty
on the total welfare. Let X represent either K or Υ11 and
suppose it has mean μX and variance σ2X . Then TW (X) =
aX2 + bX + c implies E[TW (X)] = aσ2X +μ2X) + bμX + c,
so that when a, b < 0, both ∂E[TW (X)]μK and
∂E[TW (X)]
σK
are
negative; i.e., the expected total welfare decreases with both
the mean and variance of the arc capacity. This suggests that
unreliability of the added or expanded link could exacerbate
the paradoxical behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
We developed a mathematical equilibrium model that inte-
grates the supply and transportation of fuels with the strategic
decisions of generators and the market-balancing function
of the ISO over a congested electricity network with price-
sensitive demands. Although it approximates generators as
Cournot competitors having bounded rationality with respect
to ISO decisions, a previous study [13] showed that it yields
electricity prices and quantities that are similar to results
obtained from a more detailed agent-based simulation in which
generators submit supply function bids with learning. In this
paper, we proved the existence of an equilibrium under two
formulations: one in which a fuel dispatcher delivers fuel
at minimum cost and its dual prices act as cost signals to
the generators; and another for the case of unlimited fuel
supplies in which the generators make fuel acquisitions in
light of the true costs. However, we found some instances
in which expanding capacity of either electricity transmission
or the transportation of low-cost fuel can harm the total
welfare under bounded or full generator rationality or both.
While the model appears useful for planning purposes, more
This is a manuscript of an article from IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 25 (2010): 1337, doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2039587. Posted with permission.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 10
TABLE VIII
EQUILIBRIA FOR EXAMPLE 3 WITH K = 1 UNDER DIFFERENT GENERATOR RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS. FOR INTERMEDIATE VALUES OF Υ11 ,
WELFARE MEASURES ARE GIVEN AS COEFFICIENTS (a, b, c) OF aΥ211 + bΥ11 + c.
Υ11 Gen. Rat. y1 y2 f PS CS TR TW
0 Full, Bdd. 1.013 2.493 0.760 3.622 5.324 0.000 8.946
(0, 1.013) Bdd. 1.013 2.493 0.760 0, 0.740, 3.622 0, 0, 5.324 0.000 0, 0.740, 8.946
[1.013, 1.333) Bdd. Υ11 3.000 −0.500Υ11 0.750Υ11 -0.125, 0, 4.5 0.0625, 0.75, 4.5 0.000 -0.0625, 0.75, 9.0
[1.333, 1.667) Bdd. Υ11 2.333 1.000 -1, 2.5, 2.722 0.5, -1, 6.056 0, 1, -1.333 -0.5, 2.5, 7.444
[1.667,∞) Bdd. 1.667 2.333 1.000 4.111 5.778 0.333 10.220
[1.250,∞) Full 1.250 1.750 1.000 4.625 3.812 0.500 8.937
TABLE IX
EQUILIBRIUM QUANTITIES AND PRICES UNDER BOUNDED RATIONALITY FOR EXAMPLE 4.
Υ21 y1 y2 f12 f13 f23 p1 p2 p3 PS1 PS2 CS2 CS3 TR TW
23 28.362 23.221 1.731 26.631 24.900 48.333 48.198 48.469 803.6 607.7 1.3 1327.7 10.1 2750.5
24 27.362 23.723 1.231 26.131 24.900 47.334 45.700 48.969 747.9 562.2 1.5 1302.1 122.1 2735.8
investigation into the reasons behind paradoxical effects of
infrastructure expansions is warranted.
APPENDIX A
EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA
First we show that, in the GiP-B problem, the decision
variables lie in a closed and bounded set. The problem can
be restated as:
GiP-B maxyi≥0 (η(y) + φi − πi)yi
s.t. yi ≤ Vi [μi ≥ 0]
where
η(y) =
yi +
∑
j =i yj −
∑nE
j=1
φj−aj
bj∑nE
j=1
1
bj
.
Let V ≡ ∏i∈N [0, Vi] be the Cartesian product of all
generators’ feasible injections.
Lemma 3: The decision variable of generator i in GiP-B
lies in a compact set.
Proof: As yi is bounded from above and below, it clearly
lies in a compact set.
Next, consider the ISO optimization problem. First, note
that both ISOP and its Dorn dual, ISOD, are feasible for any
y. Also note that, as M is negative definite and r is not in
the objective of ISOP, the pair ISOP and ISOD possess strong
duality. This means that they both have optimal solutions of
the same objective value. First we will show that any q in an
optimal solution to ISOP lies in a compact set independent of
y.
Lemma 4: Consider ISOP for some vector of injections y ∈
V . For any optimal solution, {q¯, r¯}, q¯ must lie in a compact
set, Q, which is independent of y.
Proof: For some vector y ∈ V , ISOP has a feasible
solution {q, r} = {y, 0}. As ISOP is a maximization problem,
if an optimal solution to ISOP is {q, r} = {q¯, r¯}, this yields
the following inequality:
1
2
q¯TMq¯ + aT q¯ ≥ 1
2
yTMy + aT y
≥ inf
y∈V
{
1
2
yTMy + aT y
}
.
Because M is negative definite, this in-
equality defines a compact set, Q ≡
{
q : 1
2q
TMq + aT q ≥ infy∈V
{
1
2y
TMy + aT y
}}
,
independent of y.
In the game, the generators make their decisions with
knowledge of the ISO dual variables. Thus, we show that the
prices as well as quantities found in ISOD also lie in a compact
set that is independent of the generator decisions.
Lemma 5: Consider ISOD for some vector of injections y ∈
V . For any optimal solution, {q¯, p¯, η¯, λ¯+, λ¯−}, q¯, p¯, η¯, λ¯+ and
λ¯− must lie in a compact set, which is independent of y.
Proof: As ISOD is the Dorn dual of ISOP, an optimal
solution to ISOD defines an optimal solution for ISOP; hence,
we know from Lemma 4 that imposing the constraint q¯ ∈
Q will not affect the solution set of ISOD. From the first
constraint of ISOD, we have that p is a linear function of q;
hence, p¯ lies in a compact set independent of y.
For any y ∈ V , ISOD has a feasible solution
{q, p, η, λ+, λ−} = {−M−1a, 0, 0, 0, 0}. As ISOD is a
minimization problem, if an optimal solution to ISOD is{
q¯, p¯, η¯, λ¯+, λ¯−
}
, then the following inequality is valid:
yT p¯ + KT
(
λ¯+ + λ¯−
)− 1
2
q¯TMq¯ ≤ −1
2
aTM−1a;
thus,
KT
(
λ¯+ + λ¯−
) ≤ 1
2
q¯TMq¯ − yT (a + Mq¯)− 1
2
aTM−1a.
As M is negative definite, we know that for a fixed y,
max
q
{
1
2
qTMq − yT (a + Mq)
}
=
1
2
yTMy−yT (a + My) .
Hence,
KT
(
λ¯+ + λ¯−
)
≤ 12yTMy − yT (a + My)− 12aTM−1a
≤ sup
y∈V
{
1
2y
TMy − yT (a + My)− 12aTM−1a
}
= θ.
As K > 0 and ISOD requires that λ+, λ− ≥ 0, we therefore
have an upper bound on every element of λ+ and λ−:
0e ≤ λ¯+, λ¯− ≤ θ
min
l∈B
Kl
e.
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These lie in compact sets independent of y. Finally, as η is a
linear function of λ+, λ− and p, it follows that η¯ must lie in
a compact set, independent of y.
Finally we consider the fuel dispatch problem and introduce
the following bounds on the fuel dispatcher’s (FDD) decision
variables:
ωg, ρgj , πj ≤ max
gj∈A
{cgj}+ max
i∈N
{ai}+ , (34)
where  > 0. As all players’ decisions variables now lie in
a compact set, we can invoke Rosen’s theorem in [23] which
proves that there exists an equilibrium for this game. Denoting
equilibrium quantities by *, we will show that
ω∗g , ρ
∗
gj , π
∗
j < max
gj∈A
{cgj}+ max
i∈N
{ai}+ .
Lemma 6: Consider the fuel dispatch problem FDP and
its dual FDD; if x∗gj is strictly positive at equilibrium then
ω∗g , ρ∗gj , π
∗
j ≤ max
i∈N
{ai}.
Proof: Suppose x∗gj > 0. Then as the FDD constraint is
orthogonal to x we have
π∗j = cgj + ρ
∗
gj + ω
∗
g . (35)
For this to be an equilibrium point, FDP must be optimal;
hence,
y∗j =
∑
g∈F
x∗gj > 0. (36)
Note that from GiP-B we have that
yj (πj)|πj=max
i∈N
{ai} = 0, (37)
where maxi∈N {ai} is the maximum possible nodal price. We
also note that the optimal yi is non-increasing in πi. This
together with (36) and (37) imply
π∗j ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} . (38)
Finally, because c, ω and ρ are non-negative, (35) and (38)
imply
ω∗g ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} and ρ∗gj ≤ max
i∈N
{ai},
as required.
In the following theorem, we show that no equilibrium can
exist at the imposed bounds.
Theorem 7: Suppose we have an equilibrium to the game
consisting of ISOD, FDD and GiP-B, i ∈ N . At the equi-
librium ω∗g , ρ∗gj , and π∗j are all strictly less than the imposed
bounds given by (34).
Proof: Here we will find true bounds on the equilibrium
quantities on the fuel dispatcher.
The bound on ω∗g is found as follows: either node g is such
that ∃j |x∗gj > 0, or x∗gj = 0 (∀j); in the former case, from
Lemma 6 we have
ω∗g ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} ,
while in the latter, as 0 ≤ ωg ⊥Zg−
∑
j xgj ≥ 0 and Zg > 0,
it follows that
ω∗g = 0.
Hence, ω∗g ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} (∀g).
The bound on ρ∗gj is found as follows: either x∗gj > 0 or
x∗gj = 0; if x∗gj > 0 then from Lemma 6
ρ∗gj ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} ,
or if x∗gj = 0, as 0 ≤ ρgj ⊥Ugj − xgj ≥ 0 and Ugj > 0 then
ρ∗gj = 0.
Therefore, ρ∗gj ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} (∀gj).
To find a bound on πj , we know that either y∗j > 0 or
y∗j = 0. In the former case, from Lemma 6,
π∗j ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} ;
in the latter, as ρgj = 0 (∀g) and from FDD we know π∗j ≤
cgj + ρ∗gj + ω
∗
g ; therefore,
π∗j ≤ max
i
{cgj}+ max
i∈N
{ai} ,
and hence, π∗j ≤ max
g∈F
{cgj} + max
i∈N
{ai} (∀j). Therefore, at
equilibrium we have,
ω∗g ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} ,
ρ∗gj ≤ max
i∈N
{ai} ,
π∗j ≤ max
g∈F
{cgj}+ max
i∈N
{ai} .
These inequalities imply
ω∗g , ρ
∗
gj , π
∗
j < max
gj∈A
{cgj}+ max
i∈N
{ai}+ ,
as required.
Here we have shown that there exist bounds for the fuel
dispatcher’s decision which would never be met at equilibrium.
Following is the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof: The feasible region in each problem is defined by
a set of linear constraints and, therefore, is convex. Moreover,
each player’s objective function is concave in its own deci-
sion variables and continuous in the other players’ decision
variables. Lemma 3 establishes that each generator’s decision
variables lie in a compact set, independent of φ and π. By
Lemma 5, the optimal solution to ISOD is contained within
some compact set independent of y. Therefore, artificial lower
and upper bounds can be imposed on the ISOD variables
whereby these bounds will never be active at an optimal
solution for any y ∈ V . This augmented problem has the same
optimal solution as the original problem, but now satisfies
the condition that its decision variables lie in a compact set.
Theorem 7 states that artificial bounds on the fuel dispatcher
decision variables render those decision sets compact but do
not interfere with the equilibrium. The result follows from
Theorem 1 in [23].
APPENDIX B
UNLIMITED FUEL SUPPLIES
The proof of Theorem 2 is as follows:
Proof: As the ISOD problem is affected only by the value
of y, it is clear that since E is an equilibrium to the ISOD,
FDPi, GiP-B′ game, the ISOD problem will remain optimal.
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Here we show that for each i, {wik = x∗ik, k = 1, . . . ,mi}
and η∗ are optimal in FGiP-B. Without loss of optimality, for
a given value of yi in FGiP-B, assign wik = Υik for k < s,
wis = yi−
∑s−1
k=1 Υik, and wik = 0 for k > s, where s is such
that
∑s−1
k=1 Υik ≤ yi <
∑s
k=1 Υik; at the equilibrium point,
t is the value of s that corresponds to y∗i . From FDD it can
be shown that if w∗it = 0 then γi,t−1 ≤ π∗i ≤ γit; otherwise,
π∗i = γit.
The profit function for generator i in GiP-B ′, given πi = π∗i ,
can be written as
PG(y) = (η (y) + φi − π∗i ) yi +
mi∑
h=1
ρhUh
We can substitute ρh out of the above equation as we know
that ρh = 0 for h ≥ t and ρh = π∗i − ch for h < t. This gives
the following equation:
PG(y) = (η (y) + φi − π∗i ) yi
+
t−1∑
k=1
(π∗i − ch)Uh
= (η (y) + φi − π∗i )
mi∑
k=1
wik
+
t−1∑
k=1
(π∗i − γik)Υik.
As E is an equilibrium, this function is maximized at y i = y∗i .
Now the profit function for generator i in FGiP-B is
PF (y) =
mi∑
k=1
(η (y) + φi − γik)wik.
We can see that both profit functions have the same value at
the equilibrium point, E .
PG(y∗) = (η (y∗) + φi − π∗i )
mi∑
k=1
w∗ik
+
t−1∑
k=1
(π∗i − γik)Υik
= (η (y∗) + φi − π∗i )
mi∑
k=1
w∗ik
+
t−1∑
k=1
(π∗i − γik)w∗ik
=
mi∑
k=1
(η (y∗) + φi − γik)w∗ik
= PF (y∗).
Now we will show that for any deviation from w = x∗ the
profit from the GiP-B′ problem will be greater than or equal
to the profit from the FGiP-B problem. As the GiP-B problem
is at a global maximum, by assumption, then FGiP-B must
also be maximized at the same point.
Taking the difference of the two profit functions gives
PG(y)− PF (y) =∑mi
k=1 (γik − π∗i )wik +
∑t−1
k=1 (π
∗
i − γik)Υik ≥ 0
Therefore for any ,
PF (y∗)− PF (y∗ + ) =
PF (y∗)− PG(y∗ + ) + PG(y∗ + )− PF (y∗ + ) ≥
PF (y∗)− PG(y∗) + PG(y∗ + )− PF (y∗ + ) ≥ 0
As all the players in the ISOD, FGiP-B game are optimal,
we are at an equilibrium point.
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